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Abstract: This paper provides a pan-EU mapping of energy affordability using energy expenditure 
shares. Large variations in energy expenditure shares are identified, with the shares being significantly 
higher in New Member States than the EU15. First, these variations indicate that a single expenditure-
based pan-EU fuel poverty metric is problematic; there is a trade-off between a metric identifying 
households in most need within individual Member States and one identifying households in a similar 
position across Member States. Second, household-level data from the UK, France and the Republic 
of Ireland are used to simulate the impact of ‘policy interventions’, involving energy expenditure 
reductions or income increases, on the recorded rate of fuel poverty. These simulations highlight that 
emphasising high-level fuel poverty metrics may distort policymakers’ choices towards improving the 
‘picture’ of fuel poverty rather than maximising welfare improvements. Robust impact assessments 
identifying the fuel poverty interventions which deliver the greatest welfare increases for a given cost 
offer a better means of policy evaluation.  
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1 This paper is a revised version of Deller (2016) which drew evidence from a report commissioned by the 
Centre on ReguIation in Europe (CERRE).  The report, Deller and Waddams (2015a), is available at:   
http://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/Affordability_FinalReport.pdf (last accessed 29/8/17) 
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1. Introduction2 
Energy affordability has become an increasingly important issue in the EU3 with CEER-BEUC’s 
2020 Vision for Europe’s Energy Customers4 including ‘Affordability’ as one of its four core 
principles to which energy regulators should adhere. There is also increased focus on energy 
poverty at the EU level with the establishment of The Energy Poverty Taskforce5 and the 
European Energy Poverty Observatory6 in 2016. The present paper expands the discourse on 
energy/fuel poverty7 towards the wider topic of energy affordability and the distribution of 
energy market outcomes across EU households. While fuel poverty is defined as “the 
phenomenon whereby a household struggles to afford adequate (energy) services”8, the 
present paper assesses wider variations in the extent to which energy services are more or 
less affordable across household groups and Member States (MS). Here, fuel poverty is seen 
as a notable subset of the energy affordability topic.9  
                                                          
2 Abbreviations: Member State (MS); energy expenditure share (ENEXShr); New Member State (NMS); energy 
expenditure (ENEX); percentage of households with an energy expenditure exceeding 10% (ENEX10); Low 
Income-High Cost (LIHC); European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC); Republic of 
Ireland (RoI) 
3 Thomson et al. (2016) document this increasing attention. 
4 See CEER (2014). 
5 Established at the European Policy Centre, see: 
http://www.epc.eu/prog_forum.php?forum_id=67&prog_id=8 (last accessed 29.8.17) 
6 Established at Manchester University, see: http://www.mui.manchester.ac.uk/cure/research/projects/euro-
energy-poverty-observatory/ (last accessed 29.8.17) 
7 The terms “energy” and “fuel” have the same meaning in this paper, i.e. all fuel sources used within the 
home. 
8 See section 2.1, pp. 564, Thomson and Snell (2013). 
9 While some may argue the fuel poor are automatically ‘vulnerable’, it is probably more useful to consider fuel 
poverty and vulnerability as distinct topics, i.e. someone can be fuel poor without being vulnerable and vice 
versa. For example, Ofgem, the UK energy regulator, does not have a statutory duty regarding the fuel poor, 
but does have an explicit legal duty to consider the interests of consumers who are of pensionable age, 
disabled, chronically sick, on low incomes or live in rural areas, see Ofgem (2015). The current paper’s focus is 
affordability rather than vulnerability.  
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First, the paper maps differences in energy affordability across the EU using energy 
expenditure share (ENEXShr) data thereby complementing the existing literature which 
utilises European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)10 to compare 
households’ self-reported assessments of affordability. The average ENEXShr data presented 
in section 5.1 emphasises a striking difference in energy affordability between the EU15 and 
New Member States (NMS). In 2010, the average ENEXShr across the EU15 was 4.6%, but 
among NMS it was 10.9%.  
Second, the paper analyses individual household-level data from the UK, France and the 
Republic of Ireland (RoI) to highlight the main fuel poverty metrics provide only a picture of 
fuel poverty and households’ welfare. Labelling a particular metric ‘official’ risks encouraging 
policymakers to implement policies delivering the largest improvements in the official metric 
rather than policies delivering the greatest welfare improvements to the households in most 
need.  
While gathering further evidence on the extent of fuel poverty is important, section 6.3 argues 
that this evidence should be seen ‘in the round’ and the levels of individual indicators should 
not be used as ‘targets’ against which policy performance is assessed. This recommendation 
goes against a conclusion of Hills (2012), when designing the UK’s Low Income-High Cost 
(LIHC) metric, that there should be greater integration between high-level metrics and fuel 
poverty policies.11 Policymakers need to accept that most fuel poverty metrics are likely to be 
imperfect: metrics with desirable statistical characteristics may be difficult to communicate 
to non-specialists or require extensive, i.e. costly, data collection. Robust impact assessments 
                                                          
10 This data (or its precursor survey) is used by Healy and Clinch (2002), Poggi and Florio (2010), Thomson and 
Snell (2013), Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero (2015) and Thomson et al. (2017).  
11Hills (2012), Recommendation 6, page 11 states: “The Government should use the LIHC Indicator and fuel 
poverty gap as the basis for operational target setting”. 
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comparing the energy expenditure (ENEX) reductions or welfare gains achieved against the 
costs of an intervention are a more direct way to assess the benefits of fuel poverty alleviation 
schemes. 
The analysis for the UK, France and RoI simulates the impact of ‘policy interventions’ on the 
percentage of households devoting at least 10% of their expenditure to energy (ENEX10)12. 
The ‘policy interventions’ involve ENEX reductions or income increases targeted at alternative 
household groups. The simulations, presented in section 5.3, demonstrate that: 
(i) even ‘large’ interventions reduce ENEX10 by relatively small amounts; 
(ii) the ‘effectiveness’ of interventions in reducing ENEX10 depends on the ENEXShr 
distribution and average income in the target group; 
(iii) and increasing household income has virtually no impact on ENEX10 despite 
welfare gains for households.  
This analysis complements the work of Heindl and Schuessler (2015), by extending fuel 
poverty simulations to additional MS and highlighting the factors affecting the ability to 
improve recorded fuel poverty. 
Given the ENEXShr variations reported in section 5.1, adopting a common ENEX based fuel 
poverty metric across the EU is likely to be problematic. If a common fixed ENEX threshold, 
such as ENEX10, were adopted, in some NMS such a high proportion of the population would 
be identified as fuel poor that the classification’s usefulness would be lost. Equally, if a 
‘relative’ ENEX metric was selected, the nature of households labelled as ‘fuel poor’ would 
                                                          
12 ENEX10 is analysed due to its intuitive behaviour when income and expenditure change, as noted by Heindl 
and Schuessler (2015). Deller and Waddams (2015b) report the results of identical simulations using the UK 
data for the alternative twice median ENEXShr and LIHC metrics. Deller and Waddams (2015b) highlight that 
these metrics may record an increase in fuel poverty following specific ENEX reductions/income increases due 
to movements in the position of the fuel poverty thresholds. 
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vary considerably between MS. The large variations also suggest that a ‘rational’ EU-wide fuel 
poverty policy would require significant cross-border transfers, something which could face 
political obstacles. This paper’s evidence provides support to the European Commission’s 
position, expressed by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič, that there should not be a common EU 
definition of energy/fuel poverty due to the differing circumstances of each MS.13  
The current paper stands in contrast to Thomson et al.’s (2016) arguments that a common EU 
fuel poverty definition would be beneficial by increasing fuel poverty’s prominence14 and 
clarifying the term’s meaning. As any fuel poverty definition incorporates value judgements, 
and social policy is the responsibility of MS, it seems appropriate for democratically elected 
national governments to choose their preferred fuel poverty definition and policy. Also, 
having a common definition which is not optimised for specific MS’s circumstances risks 
misdirecting resources. Nevertheless, the current paper agrees with Thomson et al. (2016) 
that the EU has a legitimate role in enabling policy synergies across MS. The EU can support 
synergies by increasing the availability of high-quality pan-EU affordability data, as argued by 
Thomson et al. (2017), and by collating robust impact assessments that identify effective 
policy interventions. 
Section 5.2 also highlights how tracking EU-SILC indicators through time draws attention to 
challenges in these indicators’ interpretation. The discussion of this point in section 6.2 adds 
                                                          
13 See ‘EU to tackle ‘energy poverty’’ by Peter Teffer, EUobserver, Brussels, 30 November 2016, available at: 
https://euobserver.com/energy/136095 (last accessed 29.8.17). Also see: ‘Maroš Šefcovic: 2016 is the year of 
delivery on energy union’ by Rajnish Singh, The Parliament Magazine, Brussels, available at: 
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/interviews/maro%C5%A1-%C5%A1efcovic-2016-year-
delivery-energy-union (last accessed 29.8.17). 
14 Bouzarovski et al. (2012) argue the lack of an institutional centre has made fuel poverty’s position within 
European institutions precarious. 
6 
 
to Thomson et al. (2017) and Tirado Herrero (2017) by specifying lived experience indicators 
which capture tightly defined situations faced by fuel poor households. 
2. Background – Energy Affordability Indicators 
There are a variety of ways to assess energy affordability and fuel poverty, as discussed by 
Thomson et al. (2017) and Tirado Herrero (2017). Figure 1 shows how these indicators broadly 
fall into three categories: (a) ENEX-based indicators, (b) self-reports of the lived experience15, 
and (c) proxy indicators. As argued by Tirado Herrero (2017), it is difficult to identify a single 
‘best’ affordability metric, with different indicators providing different pieces of evidence. The 
long-term task must be to triangulate the varying evidence to obtain a richer understanding 
of energy affordability and/or fuel poverty. The purpose of the present paper is to illustrate 
issues and questions surrounding the existing indicators of types (a) and (b). A detailed 
discussion of these issues and potential ways forward for policymakers is provided in section 
6. 
When attempting to assess energy affordability across the EU, proxy indicators appear less 
desirable than indicators (a) and (b) since they are ‘indirect’: their validity is dependent on 
robust statistical relationships existing with indicators (a) and (b). These statistical 
relationships could vary between MS and through time, and establishing these relationships 
is beyond the scope of this paper. While proxy indicators are not used in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, 
they may be attractive for policy targeting as data on their prevalence may already be 
collected by government. For this reason, proxy indicators are used to ‘target’ policies in 
Section 5.3. 
                                                          
15 Indicators of type (b) are referred to as ‘Consensual’ by Thomson et al. (2017) and Tirrado Herrero. 
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Figure 1: Alternative indicators of energy affordability 
Beyond proxy indicators, a major set of indicators not studied in this paper are those based 
on required ENEX, since only actual ENEX figures are available at the pan-EU level. Required 
ENEX is where the ENEX for a household to achieve a particular target temperature (and other 
specified energy services) is modelled on the basis of a dwelling’s physical characteristics. 
Required ENEX has the intuitive attraction over actual ENEX that it is not depressed if a 
household consciously restricts energy consumption due to affordability difficulties. 
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However, as Tirrado Herrero (2017) notes, required ENEX is dependent on the quality of the 
assumptions and modelling employed to calculate it, hence, the advantage of required ENEX 
over actual ENEX is less clear than it first appears.   
Two further points are worth noting. First, while population averages are useful indicators to 
assess energy affordability, they are less useful in identifying the fuel poor. Second, splitting 
self-reports of the lived experience into two distinct categories is deliberate: although 
householders’ perceptions provide information about their view of a situation, respondents 
may attach different meanings to phrases such as “adequate” and “keep warm”.16 
3. Methodology 
Two main methods are followed: (i) analysis of descriptive statistics utilising high-level data 
from Eurostat data tables, and (ii) simulations of alternative policies on ENEX-based fuel 
poverty rates harnessing micro-data from France, the ROI and the UK.  
3.1 Calculating EU Averages 
In section 5.1 the average ENEXShr reported for the EU15, EU28 and NMS are weighted 
means: each MS’s contribution is weighted by a MS’s percentage of the total 2013 population 
of the MS used to calculate the relevant average.17 This means large MS, such as Germany, 
have more influence on the averages than small MS, such as Luxembourg. The weighted 
averages use the subset of MS where Eurostat provides ENEXShr data for all years.18 This 
approach avoids intertemporal fluctuations resulting from changes in the set of MS 
                                                          
16 See Tirrado Herrero (2017) for further discussion. 
17 Eurostat’s ENEXShr averages are not used as they do not always cover all time periods or the sub-group of 
MS considered. The population figures are available at: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjan&lang=en (last accessed 29.8.17). 
18 The MS contributing to the averages in particular figures are described in section 4.1.  
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considered. These weighting methods are also used when calculating the averages of the EU-
SILC indicators in section 5.2.  
As the EU averages are based on Eurostat’s data tables rather than micro-data from individual 
MS, the averages are intended to be illustrative and to spur further research. 
3.2 Policy Simulations 
Although Eurostat’s aggregate ENEXShr data provides an overview of energy affordability in 
the EU, a greater understanding requires micro-data from individual households. Household 
level data makes it possible to: (a) compare the fuel poverty rate when using alternative fuel 
poverty metrics and (b) assess the impact of policies on the fuel poverty rate. 
The simulations complement work by Heindl and Schuessler (2015). Compared to Heindl and 
Schuessler, not only are additional MS considered, but the current simulations are more 
applied, investigating how targeting policies at alternative household groups influences 
ENEX10. In contrast, Heindl and Schuessler use ENEX and income changes to explore the 
behaviour of alternative fuel poverty metrics. By considering ENEX10 in MS beyond Germany 
and a wider range of target groups, the simulations also complement Heindl (2013).19 
In Section 5 the policy simulations investigate the impact of four interventions: 
(a) €250 increase in income (proxied by increasing total expenditure) 
(b) €50 decrease in ENEX 
(c) €100 decrease in ENEX  
                                                          
19 Looking at ENEXShr in a European perspective also extends Advani et al. (2013) beyond the UK. 
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(d) €250 decrease in ENEX20  
These figures were chosen as plausible amounts given the value of energy bills and the likely 
cost of the interventions. For the years considered, €250 represents, as a percentage of 
median household energy expenditure, 18.7% in the UK, 22.7% in France and 15.5% in the 
RoI. Table A2 shows the inteventions’ indicative costs would be substantial; monetary 
transfers of €250 to the largest target groups in France and the UK would cost around €2bn 
per annum per intervention in 2017 prices21. The simulations represent additional 
interventions over and above any fuel poverty schemes in place when the surveys took place. 
The particular policies that achieve (a)-(d) (e.g. improved insulation vs monetary transfers) 
are not assessed, rather the effect of (a)-(d) on ENEX10 is evaluated.  It is assumed that the 
ENEX reductions do not reduce households’ welfare, simply the cost of energy services. 
Interventions (a)-(d) are targeted at different sections of the population, e.g. single parent 
households vs retired households, with the target groups chosen according to the availability 
of identifiers within each survey.  
The simulations do not incorporate households’ response to increases in income/decrease in 
ENEX. In reality, households will likely adjust their consumption of all goods in response to an 
intervention. Modelling these demand responses is beyond the scope of the paper. In 
particular, a €250 income increase may stimulate an increase in ENEX. Depending on the size 
of the ENEX increase, an income increase could even lead to an individual household’s 
                                                          
20 For the UK, conversion into pounds sterling used the market exchange rate on 29 June 2012 of 0.8068 euros 
to the pound. 
21 Costs for the UK were converted into Quarter 2 2017 prices using the ONS’s Consumer Price Index (CPI), see 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/d7bt/mm23 (last accessed 8/12/17). 
Cost for France and the RoI utilised the ECB’s Harmonised Index of Consumer Price (HICP), see 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_statistics/escb/html/table.en.html?id=JDF_ICP_COICOP_INX&period=20
17-06 (last accessed 8/12/17). 
11 
 
ENEXShr increasing.22 While ignoring demand response is a significant simplification, including 
it is likely to reinforce the paper’s findings that: (a) even ‘large’ interventions reduce ENEX10 
by small amounts and (b) increasing income has a particularly small impact on ENEX10. 
The first step in the simulations was to estimate ENEX10 for the population as a whole. 
Interventions (a)-(d) were then applied to the different target groups.23 Since ENEX is a 
component of total expenditure, total expenditure was also recalculated after interventions 
(b)-(d).24 Lastly, ENEX10 for the population as a whole was recalculated after each 
intervention.  
As explained in section 5.3.2, a range of factors determine an intervention’s ability to move 
the central estimate of ENEX10. To summarise the impact of these factors an ‘effectiveness’ 
metric has been constructed which can be interpreted (assuming the ENEX reductions are 
monetary interventions)25 as the percentage point change in ENEX10 per €100m of policy 
expenditure per annum. The metric is calculated by dividing the percentage point change in 
ENEX10 resulting from an intervention by the number of households in the target group26 and 
the value of the monetary intervention before multiplying the resulting figure by 100m. This 
metric aids comparison between interventions within a given MS, however, caution is needed 
                                                          
22 A simple numerical example illustrates this point. Consider a household with an initial income of €10,000 
and an ENEX of €1,000 which receives an income supplement of €250 and chooses to spend €50 of this on 
ENEX; here ENEXShr will rise from 10% to 10.2%. However, generally energy is an income inelastic product, i.e. 
for a given percentage increase in income ENEX will increase by a smaller percentage amount, hence, 
households that see ENEXShr increase following an income increase are likely to be rare. 
23 If an intervention resulted in negative ENEX, ENEX was put to zero in France and the RoI. This was not done 
for the UK as the raw data treated negative ENEX as legitimate due to rebates associated with the UK’s energy 
billing system. 
24 Without this adjustment, interventions (b)-(d) would have a slightly greater impact on reducing ENEX10. 
25 In theory, energy efficiency investments or education programmes might reduce ENEX by €100m for less 
than €100m of policy expenditure. 
26 Household numbers were obtained by multiplying the percentage of households in a target group identified 
from the survey data with the total number of households in the relevant MS obtained from the UNECE 
Statistical Database, see at: http://w3.unece.org/PXWeb2015/pxweb/en/STAT/STAT__30-GE__02-
Families_households/08_en_GEFHPrivHouse_r.px/?rxid=639ea214-8b4c-4e78-80dc-35f243ef0be4 (last 
accessed 7/12/17). The household population figures for France and the RoI refer to 2010.  
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before comparison across MS as the more households there are within a MS the greater the 
cost of moving ENEX10. Given the multiple sources of uncertainty present, the ‘effectiveness’ 
metric is purely indicative of the difficulty of moving ENEX10 across interventions rather than 
a robust cost estimate.  
Effectiveness is placed in inverted commas as the metric illustrates how interventions alter 
the picture of ENEX10 fuel poverty rather than households’ actual welfare. Assuming the 
interventions are monetary transfers, the intervention with the highest effectiveness value 
will result in the greatest percentage point change in the central estimate of ENEX10 for a 
given cost, although, the magnitude of the resulting change in ENEX10 could be (very) small. 
For both the ENEX10 and ‘effectiveness’ metric results, two benchmarks are included to aid 
interpretation: (i) applying each monetary intervention to all households and (ii) applying 
each intervention to households with ENEXShr in the top decile.   
4. Data 
4.1 Eurostat Data 
A pan-EU perspective on energy affordability is possible using two data sources: (i) Eurostat’s 
collated household budget survey database27 and (ii) EU-SILC data28. (i) enables comparison 
of average ENEXShr, while (ii) includes the percentage reporting an ‘inability to keep your 
home adequately warm’ and the percentage reporting ‘arrears on utility bills’.29 The existing 
literature (see footnote 10) focuses on the EU-SILC data as it provides annual indicators which 
                                                          
27 See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/household-budget-surveys/database (last accessed 29.8.17). 
28 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database (last accessed 30.11.17) 
29 The percentage of households with leaks, damp or rot has been used in the past as an additional proxy for 
fuel poverty. This indicator is not used here as the strength of its link to energy affordability pressures is not 
entirely clear: damp and rot can result from ventilation issues rather than a lack of heat. 
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fit intuitive concepts of fuel poverty. For both (i) and (ii) the present analysis is based on 
Eurostat’s high-level database rather than the micro-data of the underlying surveys. 
As well as the Eurostat ENEXShr data having less to say on fuel poverty directly, it is only 
available at roughly 5 year intervals from 1988 to 2010. Nevertheless, average ENEXShr have 
clear value in understanding general energy affordability and, in particular, the political 
economy of energy markets. For example, the increasing emphasis on fuel poverty might 
represent a political response to a decline in affordability for average households, as much as 
increased concern for the fuel poor.  
The ENEXShr calculation is based on the structure of the mean consumption expenditure of 
private households in each MS and involves the numerator ‘Electricity, gas and other fuels’ 
(COICOP level CP045) and the denominator is all household consumption expenditure 
(COICOP level CP00). As noted above, only for a subset of MS are data available in all time 
periods. The EU15 average in Figure 2 is based on 8 MS30, while the EU28 average in 2005 and 
2010 is based on all MS bar Italy. In Figure 2, data on NMS covers all relevant MS, but is 
available only in 2005 and 2010. In Figure 4, MS are included that have data available for all 
years for all subgroups, however, to retain a reasonable number of EU15 MS the time series 
in Panel A only covers 1994 to 2010. Figure 4 Panel A draws on data for 9 EU15 MS31 and Panel 
B draws on data for 10 NMS32.  
Two further points regarding the Eurostat ENEXShr data should be recognised. First, the 
observed variations between MS may reflect variations in definitions, survey timing and 
survey methodologies. In particular, the UK, Czech Republic and Hungary do not include 
                                                          
30 Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. 
31 Belgium, the RoI, Greece, Spain, France, Austria, Portugal, Finland and the UK. 
32 The NMS excluded are: the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia. 
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imputed rent for owner-occupiers in total expenditure. This increases the (apparent) ENEXShr 
of these MS compared to other MS. Second, only central estimates are reported in the 
Eurostat data tables used to produce Figures 2 to 5. However, Eurostat (2015)33 reports 95% 
confidence intervals for the share of household expenditure devoted to the larger COICOP 
level CP04 ‘Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels’ in the 2010 wave. In all MS apart 
from Portugal34 the confidence interval resulting from sampling error is reported as less than 
± 0.1 percentage point.35 This suggests the differences reported in Figures 2 to 5 are likely to 
be statistically significant. 
Turning to the EU-SILC data, Figures 6 and 7 cover the period 2005 to 2016. Due to incomplete 
time series over this period the UK and RoI are dropped from the EU15 averages, while 
Romania and Croatia are dropped from the NMS averages. 
4.2 National Level Micro-Data 
In the absence of harmonised EU-wide ENEX micro-data, policy simulations are performed on 
micro-data from France, the RoI and the UK.36 The datasets used in the simulations are: the 
Living Costs and Food Survey 201237 for the UK, the Enquête Budget de Famille 2010-11 for 
France and the Irish Household Budget Survey 2009-10.  
                                                          
33 See Table 5, page 12. 
34 The confidence interval for Portugal is reported as ± 0.7 percentage points. 
35 Equivalent high-level information for the EU-SILC indicators used in this paper does not appear available in 
the relevant Eurostat quality reports. 
36 The UK and RoI were chosen due to the free availability of their household budget surveys and English 
documentation. France was selected due to the interests of a CERRE project sponsor. Additional detail on the 
simulations is available in Deller and Waddams (2015b), Deller and Waddams (2015c) and Deller and 
Waddams (2015d). 
37 The simulations do not apply corrections for seasonality and the data is also left unequivalised. Deller and 
Waddams (2017) highlight that in the UK’s Living Costs and Food Survey prior to 2013 a significant proportion 
of households using a Pre-Payment Meter (PPM) to pay for energy report zero ENEX and this is likely to be a 
case of missing/misreported data. PPMs are disproportionately located in low income households due to their 
use to manage energy debts. Correcting this data issue would increase reported ENEX10 in the UK, particularly 
for households with total expenditure beneath 60% of the median, an unemployed household head and/or 
living in social housing. The impact of a correction on the simulation results is harder to assess. 
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For each MS the denominator in ENEXShr is the total annual household expenditure variable38 
included in the dataset which is inclusive of recorded housing costs.39 In the UK, ENEX includes 
expenditure on gas, electricity and other fuels40 used to provide energy in the home as well 
as ENEX in second dwellings. In France, ENEX only includes expenditures on mains gas and 
electricity41. In RoI, ENEX represents expenditure on electricity, gas, liquid fuels and solid 
fuels. 
As the surveys occur in different years and have different methodologies, each MS is treated 
as a ‘case study’.  In each MS the weights provided with the survey data are utilised to ensure 
the data is representative of the population as a whole. There are two specific differences 
between the datasets and households worth highlighting. First, as with the Eurostat data, 
total expenditure in the UK excludes imputed rent for owner-occupiers. Second, the Enquête 
Budget de Famille includes some of France’s overseas territories, however, the weighting 
ensures this dataset is representative of France and its overseas territories combined. Since 
the population of mainland France far exceeds that of the included overseas territories, the 
results should be driven by mainland France. Appendix A describes differences in household 
characteristics between MS. 
5. Results and Discussion 
Results from three distinct, but linked, pieces of analysis are reported. In section 5.1 the 
Eurostat ENEXShr data is used to argue that an ENEX-based fuel poverty indicator is unlikely 
                                                          
38 In France the base variable used was ‘ctot’, in the UK it was ‘P550tp’, and RoI it was ‘he620’. 
39 Total expenditure rather than income was used due to the relative simplicity of its definition. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that total expenditure provides a better indication of living standards, for example, see Brewer 
and O’Dea (2012). 
40 This includes expenditure on bottled gas, paraffin, coal/coke, wood/peat and hot water/steam/ice. 
41 The analysis was restricted to these two significant categories of ENEX due to the complexity of the variables 
recording ENEX on other fuels. 
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to be suited to the specific purpose of providing a single pan-EU fuel poverty indicator. The 
simulations reported in section 5.3 widen the critique of ENEX-based fuel poverty indicators 
to the general policymaking setting by emphasising these indicators only ever provide a 
‘picture’ of fuel poverty. Unless used with sophistication, there is the risk that targeting policy 
based on these indicators distorts policy towards managing the statistical ‘picture’ of fuel 
poverty rather than maximising improvements to the lived experience of households on the 
ground. 
In response to this critique one may wonder whether self-reports of the lived experience offer 
a solution to the challenges of fuel poverty measurement. The results in section 5.2 highlight 
that self-reports potentially have their own issues as indicators. While not offering definitive 
conclusions, section 5.2 is intended to motivate further detailed research into understanding 
the behaviour of self-reports before they become hard-wired into policymaking. 
Responding to these pieces of evidence, section 6 provides guidance on how policymakers 
may proceed while addressing the critiques raised in this paper. 
5.1 Mapping Energy Expenditure Shares across the EU 
5.1.1 Differences in Average Energy Expenditure Shares 
The main finding, shown in Figure 2, is that, on average, households in NMS devoted a 
substantially higher proportion of their expenditure to energy than households in the EU15 
(10.9% vs 4.6% in 2010). The higher ENEXShr in NMS probably reflect significantly lower 
average incomes and, probably, lower quality housing. It is also noticeable that the EU15’s 
average ENEXShr is stable through time at around 4%. 
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Figure 2: Average energy expenditure shares in the EU15, NMS and EU28 
Figure 3 shows that differences between individual MS can be starker, for example, the 
average ENEXShr in Malta in 2010 was 2.7% compared to 16.5% in Hungary. There are also 
notable variations in the evolution of ENEXShr through time; while Hungarian and Romanian 
households both had an ENEXShr around 11.5% in 2005, by 2010 the average in Hungary had 
increased by 4.9 percentage points but had fallen by 2.2 percentage points in Romania.  
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Figure 3: Average energy expenditure shares in selected EU15 Member States (Panel A) and New Member 
States (Panel B) 
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The large differences between MS indicate that a common EU fuel poverty definition based 
on ENEX would be problematic: a metric/threshold identifying severe fuel poverty in one MS 
(e.g. Malta) would cover a large section of the population in another MS (e.g. Hungary). That 
Hungary’s average ENEXShr was 16.5% in 2010 implies the majority of Hungarian households 
would have been classified as fuel poor according to ENEX10.42 In Hungary the value of an 
ENEX10-based ‘fuel poor’ designation to target resources would be seriously weakened. Also, 
if a common metric supported an EU-wide fuel poverty policy, a ‘rational’ strategy would 
involve resource transfers from MS with the lowest fuel poverty rates to those with the 
highest. Realising such a strategy could be challenging as national governments, quite 
reasonably, may make different judgements regarding acceptable energy inequalities. 
Perhaps recognising that identifying a large percentage of households as fuel poor is 
unhelpful, EC (2010) suggested twice the national average ENEXShr as an appropriate metric 
to identify a ‘considerable (energy) expenditure share’. While such a metric allows a common 
and relevant fuel poverty definition across MS, the households identified as fuel poor in each 
MS will face very different circumstances. Taking examples from Figure 3, a fuel poor 
household in Sweden would have had an ENEXShr of at least 9% in 2010, while a fuel poor 
household in Hungary would have had an ENEXShr of at least 32%. Relative metrics, i.e. those 
linked to the ‘average’ situation in individual MS, enable a comparison of ENEXShr inequality 
between MS43, but cannot provide straightforward comparisons regarding the depth of fuel 
poverty. For fixed threshold ENEX metrics, such as ENEX10, the issues are reversed: 
                                                          
42 The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia also had average ENEXShr exceeding 10% in 2010. 
43 A greater proportion of households reporting ENEX above ‘twice the national average’ indicates greater 
inequality. 
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comparisons of fuel poverty levels between MS are straightforward but a common metric 
cannot effectively target policies in all MS. 
5.1.2 Inequalities in Energy Expenditure Shares 
While not addressing fuel poverty directly, the ENEXShr data allows evaluation of more 
general distributional issues by breaking out ENEXShr by household type. Figure 4 shows the 
ordering of average ENEXShr across household types is the same for the EU15 and NMS: 
retired households and households in the bottom income quintile have the highest ENEXShr, 
while households with children have the lowest.  
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Figure 4: Energy expenditure shares by household type averaged across the EU15 (Panel A) and NMS (Panel 
B) 
The ‘equality’ of energy outcomes can also be assessed using the ratio of the average ENEXShr 
for households in the bottom income quintile relative to the average ENEXShr for all 
households. This ratio is reported for selected MS in Figure 5. A higher value indicates greater 
inequality, however, it does not automatically imply a ‘problem’ with the energy market: a 
higher value could result from greater income inequality. 
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Figure 5: The average energy expenditure share for low income households as a multiple of the average 
energy expenditure share for all households – selected EU15 Member States (Panel A) and selected New 
Member States (Panel B) 
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The average ENEXShr for households in the bottom income quintile is generally 20-50% higher 
than the average ENEXShr for all households. However, within the EU15, Finland, Sweden and 
Austria have ENEXShr that appear more ‘equitable’: in 1994 the poorest households in Finland 
and Austria had a lower ENEXShr than the average household. 
In NMS the gap between the low income and all household average generally widened 
between 2005 and 2010; it fell in only three NMS: Hungary, Malta and Poland. This widening 
might reflect increased market liberalisation or the removal of energy subsidies which could 
have led to prices rising faster than incomes for the poorest households. Figure 5 shows this 
widening was particularly severe in Latvia. In 2005 the average ENEXShr of low income 
households in Latvia was 10% below the all household average, however, by 2010 low income 
households had an ENEXShr that was 53% above the all household average. 
5.2 Intertemporal Variations in EU-SILC Indicators 
While EU-SILC indicators’ annual collection is a key advantage over the Eurostat ENEXShr data, 
the EU-SILC indicators must be critically assessed before they are hard-wired into 
policymaking. The two EU-SILC indicators considered here are: (a) the percentage reporting 
an ‘inability to keep your home adequately warm’ and (b) the percentage reporting ‘arrears 
on utility bills’. Once these indicators are considered intertemporally new issues and avenues 
for research emerge. 
Key papers investigating fuel poverty across the EU using EU-SILC/European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) indicators are Healy and Clinch (2002) and Thomson and Snell (2013), 
however, their consideration of intertemporal variations is limited. Thomson and Snell (2013) 
focus on the cross-sectional variation in fuel poverty between MS using data from 2007, while 
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Healy and Clinch’s (2002) consideration of intertemporal changes is limited to 1994-97.44 Each 
set of authors also aggregate individual indicators into indices, however, aggregation does 
not automatically address concerns about the information which the individual indicators 
convey. Indeed, aggregation can lead to the information from individual indicators being 
obscured. 
The most sophisticated intertemporal analysis using EU-SILC/ECHP data is Poggi and Florio 
(2010). Poggi and Florio use data for a subset of MS from 1994-2001 and 2004-05 to 
investigate the potential association between privatisation, liberalisation and vertical 
disintegration and the level of “Energy deprivation”, as measured by indicator (b)45, using 
panel data methods. While using indicator (b) as a proxy for energy deprivation may be 
reasonable given the data available, the present discussion of whether better indicators can 
be identified has clear value. 
The first example of issues with the EU-SILC indicators results from comparing the average 
values of (a) and (b) for the EU15 and NMS in Figure 6. While both indicators (a) and (b) show 
a clear improvement between 2005 and 2016 for NMS, the decline for indicator (a) is 
noticeably larger than for indicator (b). Moreover, Figure 6 shows a conflicting intertemporal 
variation for (a) and (b) within NMS between 2008 and 2014. Between 2008 and 2014 the 
average percentage reporting an inability to keep their home warm in NMS fell by 8.6 
percentage points, while the average percentage reporting utility arrears rose by 4.1 
percentage points. Looking at these indicators individually over this period would lead to 
                                                          
44 Figure 3 of Thomson et al. (2017) reports indicators (a) and (b) from 2005 to 2014, although, only the EU27 
average. 
45 In the ECHP the question was phrased as the inability to pay scheduled utility bills as opposed to arrears. 
25 
 
opposite conclusions as to whether energy affordability difficulties were: (i) worsening or 
improving in NMS and (ii) converging or diverging between the EU15 and NMS. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of the population reporting an inability to keep their home warm compared to the 
percentage reporting utility bill arrears in the EU15 and NMS 
The second example is to consider indicator (b) broken down by household type; Figure 7 
reports the varying arrears rates in the EU15. Those living in households containing a person 
over the age of 65 are least likely to report arrears in the EU15. In NMS a similar ordering of 
household groups by arrears rates exists, although, for brevity, this is not reported 
graphically.46 However, there are at least four possible explanations for this observation: (i) 
older households are wealthier; (ii) policies subsidise utility consumption by the elderly more 
than other groups; (iii) older households are more conscientious bill payers; and (iv) older 
                                                          
46 The absolute level of utility bill arrears in NMS is 1.5 to 3 times the level in the EU15. 
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households feel a greater social stigma when admitting arrears. While (i) and (ii) involve the 
fundamentals of fuel poverty, one might be concerned that (iii) and (iv) represent other 
issues. Understanding the factors driving utility arrears becomes more important when one 
recalls that older households have some of the highest ENEXShr. 
 
Figure 7: Average percentage of relevant population reporting utility arrears in the EU15 by household type 
5.3 Policy Simulations 
For brevity, the simulation results for France and RoI are reported in Appendix B. The main 
qualitative conclusions, which are similar across the MS, can be understood from the UK 
simulations. The estimated proportion of households with ENEX10 in each country are 
reported in Figure 11; the RoI in 2009-10 had a noticeably lower proportion of households in 
ENEX10 (12.8%) than the UK in 2012 (17.2%) and France in 2010-11 (16.8%), which reflects 
the higher total expenditure (income) in the RoI. Section 5.3.1 reports the impact of 
27 
 
interventions on ENEX10 in the UK, while section 5.3.2 explains the factors influencing the 
impacts observed. 
5.3.1 The impact of interventions in the UK 
Figure 8 shows how the interventions alter ENEX10 in the UK. Since the target groups are 
relatively large (comprising up to a third of households), that most interventions have a small 
impact is telling. That high level metrics are difficult to move is one reason to question their 
use to assess policy effectiveness. This issue is worsened by high-level metrics being reliant 
on survey data and subject to sampling error. The 95% confidence interval for ENEX10 in the 
UK runs from 16.2% to 18.3%. This means that many of the simulated interventions, while 
benefiting households on ground, would not result in ENEX10 moving by a sufficient amount 
for the movement to be identified as statistically significant.  
 
Figure 8: Interventions’ impact on the percentage of UK households with an energy expenditure share 
exceeding 10% in 2012 (whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 8 shows that if every household in the UK in 2012 had their ENEX reduced by €250, 
ENEX10 would fall by 4.4 percentage points. This also implies that if households in ENEX10 
fuel poverty could be perfectly targeted, a €250 ENEX reduction would reduce ENEX10 by 4.4 
percentage points. Targeting a €250 ENEX reduction at households with total expenditure 
beneath 60% of the median or at households containing at least one person aged 65 or over 
also produce relatively large falls in ENEX10 (decreases of 3.3 and 2.3 percentage points 
respectively).  
Reducing ENEX has a far greater impact on ENEX10 than increasing total expenditure 
(income). Increasing all households’ total expenditure by €250 reduces ENEX10 by less than 
0.5 percentage points. The apparent poor performance of income transfers results from the 
denominator (total expenditure) being much larger than the numerator (ENEX) in the ratio 
forming ENEXShr. However, this is not a recommendation for ENEX reductions over income 
transfers. Standard microeconomic theory indicates that increasing a household’s income 
should raise their welfare by the same, or greater amount, than increasing consumption of a 
particular good/service. While a fuel poor household will value free additional energy, they 
may value additional food even more. 
Targeting interventions at households with the highest ENEXShr has a very limited impact on 
ENEX10. Reducing the ENEX of this group by €250 reduces ENEX10 by only 0.3 percentage 
points. This highlights that the 10% of UK households with the highest ENEXShr have ENEXShr 
which generally far exceed the ENEX10 threshold; the median ENEXShr of these households 
is 17.8%.  
5.3.2 Explaining the impact of different interventions 
Four main factors determine the impact of an intervention on ENEX10: 
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(i) the size of the group targeted, 
(ii) the proportion of the target group in ENEX10 fuel poverty, 
(iii) the proximity of these households’ ENEXShr to the ENEX10 threshold, and 
(iv) the total expenditure (income) of these households. 
Appendix A reports relevant data on points (i) to (iii) across the UK, France and RoI. 
Figure A1 reports the proportion households in each target group for the three MS studied. 
Figure A1 shows that households with total expenditure beneath 60% of the median, 
households containing someone 65 or older and households with children are large groups in 
the UK with each comprising more than 24% of UK households. In contrast, single parent 
households, households receiving housing benefit and households with an unemployed 
household head each comprise less than 6% of UK households. 
Figure A2 reports ENEX10 in each of the target groups. It is noticeable that in all target groups 
ENEX10 is less than 50%. This highlights the challenge of targeting fuel poverty policies; for 
the data considered, targeting interventions using common high-level household identifiers 
results in the majority of resources going to households not in ENEX10 fuel poverty. While 
targeting fuel poverty interventions using high-level identifiers is problematic, more focussed 
approaches require fuel-poverty specific data which involves its own costs and challenges. 47 
Also, existing policies may be targeted according to high-level indicators. Most notably, the 
Winter Fuel Payment in the UK is fundamentally an age-related income benefit costing around 
£2bn per annum.48 
                                                          
47 For example, see Fahmy et al (2011) and Dubois, U. (2012). 
48 See ‘Winter Fuel Payments update’, House of Commons Library, Monday, 26 June 2017, available at: 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06019 (last accessed 6.12.2017). 
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The proportion of households who are both in a target group and in ENEX10 identifies the 
maximum percentage point decrease in ENEX10 that could occur by targeting a specified 
household group. These maximum possible decreases are reported in Figure A3. In the UK the 
largest maximum decreases in ENEX10 are achievable by targeting low income or older 
households since these groups represent both a large section of the population and have high 
rates of ENEX10. In contrast, targeting households with children has a low maximum impact 
as although this group forms around 30% of households, only 10% experience ENEX10 fuel 
poverty.  
Table A1 reports the median ENEXShr of the households in each target group who are in 
ENEX10 fuel poverty. By looking at the median, rather than mean, one can understand how 
close the mass of households in ENEX10 fuel poverty are to the ENEX10 threshold. However, 
the role of households’ proximity to the ENEX10 threshold in determining interventions’ 
impact is mediated by the total expenditure (income) of households. Suppose two households 
have an 11% ENEXShr, but household A) has total expenditure of €20,000 and household B) 
has total expenditure of €40,000.49 To reduce the ENEXShr of household A) to 10% requires a 
€200 ENEX reduction, but for household B) it requires a €400 ENEX reduction. Hence, target 
groups with lower total expenditure among their fuel poor households will have a greater 
reduction in ENEX10 for a given monetary intervention, holding everything else constant. 
In Figure 9 the ‘effectiveness’ metric is designed to summarise the influence of factors (ii) to 
(iv) on an interventions’ impact on ENEX10. Note that even if the ‘effectiveness’ metric 
records a relatively high value, the magnitude of the reduction in ENEX10 may be very small.  
                                                          
49 This gives household A) ENEX of €2,200 and household B) ENEX of €4,400. 
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Figure 9: Effectiveness of interventions on reducing the percentage of UK households with an energy 
expenditure share exceeding 10% in 2012 
Figure 9 shows the most effective interventions in the UK are ENEX reductions targeted at low 
income households. That the ENEX reductions targeted at low income households have 
similar effectiveness indicates that the density of the ENEXShr distribution is fairly constant 
above the ENEX10 threshold for these households. The other relatively effective interventions 
are ENEX reductions targeted at: (i) households in social housing, (ii) where the household 
head is unemployed, and (iii) receiving income support or housing benefit. However, the 
limitations of targeting using high-level identifiers is illustrated by considering the value of the 
effectiveness metric if the interventions could be perfectly targeted, i.e. they reach all ENEX10 
fuel poor households, but no households below the ENEX10 threshold. With perfect targeting, 
the ENEX reduction interventions all deliver an effectiveness metric of around 0.4, roughly 
double the value of the most effective intervention in Figure 9.  
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
6.1 The Role of Energy Expenditure Share Distributions 
The simulations’ main insight is that, if a policymaker wants to improve the picture of fuel 
poverty given by high-level ENEX metrics, understanding ENEXShr distributions among 
different household groups is valuable. Understanding the ENEXShr distribution has two 
impacts, one positive and one that can distort policy. The positive effect is to ensure a target 
group has a high proportion of fuel poor individuals. The potential distortion is that to achieve 
the greatest improvement in a high-level ENEX metric for the lowest cost it makes sense to 
target groups where there is mass of individuals lying just above the poverty threshold. The 
distorting influence of such an approach can be understood using Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Alternative energy expenditure share distributions 
Consider two groups A) and B) that have a similar proportion of households lying above the 
ENEXShr threshold, similar average total expenditures and involve households that respond 
in a similar way to a given intervention. In A) the majority of the fuel poor lie just above the 
poverty threshold, while in B) there is a large mass of households some distance above the 
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threshold. In A), a cynical policymaker might choose interventions that reduce ENEX by only 
a small amount. This will noticeably reduce the fuel poverty rate at a relatively low cost, but 
will have limited impact on households in the deepest fuel poverty. Second, if A) and B) are 
alternative target groups, a policymaker focusing on high-level metrics would target A) as the 
fuel poverty rate could be reduced at a lower cost.  
This distorting influence is potentially present for all headcount based ENEXShr metrics. 
Highlighting this distortion is not new, for example, Bourguignon and Fields (1990) note the 
issue in relation to income poverty, while Heindl (2013) notes it in relation to fuel poverty. 
However, the seriousness of this distortion is arguably lower for ENEX-based fuel poverty than 
income poverty. Whereas as income is an absolute figure, ENEXShr is a ratio and so, as noted 
in section 5.3.2, total expenditure influences the ability to reduce ENEXShr. That ENEXShr will 
be cheaper to reduce in groups with lower average total expenditure (income) reduces the 
risk that policies targeted to maximise reductions in ENEXShr-based fuel poverty metrics fail 
to reach households in the most pressing circumstances.  
6.2 Improving Self-Reported Lived Experience Indicators 
While section 6.1 highlights challenges with ENEX-based headcount metrics, the results in 
section 5.2 indicate further research is needed around the messages to take away from self-
reports of the lived experience, such as EU-SILC data. For example, one could investigate if 
perceptions of energy affordability are influenced by political and media debates as well as 
actual changes in income, expenditure or housing conditions. That a discrepancy exists 
between households identified as fuel poor according to ‘objective’ ENEX indicators and 
‘subjective’ lived experience indicators has been recognised by Waddams Price et al. (2012) 
and Scott et al. (2008).  
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In future research it is important to investigate alternatives to the EU-SILC indicators: (a) the 
perceived ability to keep one’s home adequately warm and (b) the presence of utility bill 
arrears. Tirado Herrero (2017) and Thomson et al. (2017) explain that both indicators are 
imperfect for energy affordability/fuel poverty assessment since (a) potentially suffers from 
an ambiguity of meaning and (b) is a ‘noisy’ indicator as it includes arrears on bills other than 
energy. Given that perception based questions are always likely to raise concerns around 
meaning, it seems important to collect data relating to specific and verifiable energy-focussed 
situations. The advantage of verifiable indicators is that, with sufficient resources, research 
could investigate biases from self-reporting. Also, verifiable situations should be specific 
enough to bring clarity and vividness to policy debates.  
Below are five questions that possess at least one of the following advantages over indicators 
(a) or (b): (i) an energy specific focus, (ii) a clearly defined situation indicating affordability 
pressures, or (iii) a situation that could be verified: 
1. In the last twelve months, has your household been unable to pay your heating, 
electricity or gas bill on time due to financial pressures? 
2. In the last twelve months, has your electricity or gas supply been disconnected for the 
non-payment of bills? 
3. In the past month, have you consciously restricted the use of energy in your home to 
ensure you had sufficient money to purchase food? 
4. Consider the last time you spent money on energy, did you have to borrow money to 
make this payment/purchase? 
5. Last winter were you forced to keep your home colder than you would like due to 
financial pressures? 
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These questions are starting suggestions rather than final recommendations, for example, the 
time period to which the questions refer varies and this should be set according 
research/policy priorities. Referring to 12 months gives an overview of the year but may 
introduce recall issues. Referring to the past month reduces recall issues and introduces the 
potential for seasonality in responses related to the month(s) of interview. If all sampling is 
conducted in a single month/season this seasonality in response is undesirable, but if 
interviewing is performed throughout the year it could add to the richness of the data 
collected. 
While a bespoke pan-EU energy affordability/fuel poverty survey50 would obtain the richest 
data, this is likely to be a costly exercise. A key advantage of EU-SILC style lived experience 
questions is that they can be easily introduced into existing surveys thereby minimising the 
cost of data collection. To calculate ENEX-based indicators considerable effort is required to 
collect data on households’ total expenditure, income and/or dwelling characteristics. As a 
pragmatic first step to a better understanding of energy affordability/fuel poverty across the 
EU it seems important to collect data from questions similar in style to the five suggested 
above. Due to the existing EU-SILC indicators feeding into the long-run time series of material 
deprivation statistics in the EU51, the new indicators would add to, rather than supplant 
indicators (a) and (b). The funding of improved/additional data collection focusing specifically 
on energy affordability is an area where the EU could achieve real impact. 
6.3 A Policymaking Framework for Fuel Poverty 
                                                          
50 As argued for by Thomson et al (2017). Trinomics (2016) also explore options for energy poverty 
measurement in the EU. 
51 For example, see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Material_deprivation_statistics_-_early_results (last accessed 29.8.17). 
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As illustrated in Figure 1, a wide range of fuel poverty/affordability metrics have been 
suggested beginning with Isherwood and Hancock (1979) and expanding greatly following 
Boardman (1991). Figure 11 shows how the choice of metric can significantly alter the 
recorded fuel poverty rate. In particular, the LIHC metric dramatically reduces the recorded 
fuel poverty rate in the UK, France and RoI. In the UK in 2012, the LIHC indicator52 more than 
halves the estimated fuel poverty rate compared to ENEX10, from 17.2% to 8.4%. Yet, the 
main point of Figure 11 is that while the choice of metric alters the recorded fuel poverty rate, 
the economic positions and lived experiences of households remain unchanged. This 
highlights why an excessive emphasis on high-level fuel poverty metrics should be avoided. 
The choice of high-level metric only affects households’ actual experience if policymaking 
processes are imperfect, so that changing the metric alters the resources available for fuel 
poverty alleviation or how these resources are allocated. 
                                                          
52 Compared to the UK’s official LIHC indicator, the current analysis proxies household income with total 
expenditure, uses actual rather than required ENEX, does not equivalise total expenditure and does not deduct 
housing costs from total expenditure. 
37 
 
 
Figure 11: Percentage of households above alternative fuel poverty thresholds in the UK, France and RoI 
(whiskers show the 95% confidence interval) 
All of the metrics identified in Figure 1 incorporate various value judgements and 
assumptions. Also, different metrics, and the concepts that lie behind them, may suit different 
tasks. For example, ENEX10 based on actual ENEX is useful for assessing changes in the 
political salience of energy affordability, but far from ideal for targeting interventions. In 
contrast, while the LIHC metric has issues as a high-level metric53, targeting resources at 
households with low income and high energy consumption seems reasonable. Rather than 
assessing policy performance via movements in high-level metrics, tracking estimates of total 
ENEX reductions/welfare gains achieved seems desirable. This implies greater weight should 
be given to collecting and improving studies evaluating alternative interventions.  
                                                          
53 See Heindl and Schuessler (2015). 
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Given the distributional choices inherent to fuel poverty alleviation, an idealised policymaking 
approach would be: 
(i) Democratically elected representatives determine the resources for fuel poverty 
alleviation after assessing a broad range of evidence.54 
(ii) Resources are allocated to interventions based on impact assessments identifying 
those delivering the greatest welfare improvements for a given cost. 
Unfortunately, there are two issues with this neat split. First, selecting interventions by their 
effectiveness has implicit distributional effects by influencing which households receive 
support. Supporting particular interventions for distributional reasons, rather than on 
effectiveness grounds, could be legitimate as long as policymakers explicitly recognise the 
opportunity costs involved. 
The second issue is whether the political process, and media debates, are sufficiently 
sophisticated to move away from a single headline metric to consider a range of evidence 
when assessing fuel poverty. Unfortunately, as Thomson et al. (2016) describe under ‘path 
dependency’, classifying a metric as ‘official’ can lead to it receiving undue attention, and 
political debates’ sophistication cannot be guaranteed. In such a world the choice of ‘official’ 
fuel poverty definition, by altering the reported fuel poverty rate, may alter the resources 
allocated to fuel poverty alleviation. 
6.4 Assessing Interventions’ Effectiveness 
While stressing the importance of evaluating individual interventions, executing these 
evaluations is not necessarily straightforward. First, the value of performing affordability 
                                                          
54 This includes evidence on the relative merits of traditional income transfers relative to energy-specific 
interventions. 
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specific assessments must be recognised and appropriate resources provided. It is not 
automatic that energy efficiency interventions maximising carbon savings are most effective 
for reducing fuel poverty/increasing energy affordability.  
Furthermore, Deller and Waddams (2015e) highlight that assessments of energy efficiency 
investments rely heavily on assumptions. These assumptions fall into two categories: (i) those 
concerning incentives and market prices, and (ii) technical assumptions about the energy 
required to heat homes to an acceptable level. Estimates of financial savings based on 
engineering models should be treated with caution. For example, Fowlie et al. (2015) compare 
the predicted and actual financial returns to households receiving funds from the US’s Federal 
Weatherization Assistance Program. Although the realised data showed a negative internal 
rate of return, the scheme’s engineering models projected a positive return. One reason for 
estimated savings not being realised is that engineering models using ‘ideal’ temperatures 
can overstate pre-intervention energy costs if a household heats their home to a lower than 
‘ideal’ temperature. A critical issue when assessing the ‘under-heating’ of homes is identifying 
where individuals prefer lower temperatures. 
Given these challenges, the value of the EU collating impact evaluation studies not only comes 
from sharing information on effective interventions, but also from sharing best practice on 
the methodologies used to assess interventions. While collating impact evaluation studies 
should accelerate the identification and adoption of effective interventions, the extent of the 
policy synergies across MS suggested by Thomson et al. (2016) is unclear. When interpreting 
results from different MS, MS’ differing circumstances need to be considered; it seems logical 
that learning will be greatest among MS with similar circumstances. 
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6.5 Final Remarks 
Eurostat’s ENEXShr data highlights considerable variations in energy affordability between EU 
MS, with a particularly large divide between the EU15 and NMS. This divide, and the inherent 
linkage between fuel poverty and distributional concerns, means the identification of a 
common EU-wide fuel poverty metric is problematic.  
Simulating policy interventions highlights the risks of placing excessive emphasis on high-level 
fuel poverty metrics. Instead, greater official attention should be given to assessing, and 
developing the tools to assess, the welfare gains that specific interventions deliver. Collecting 
data on variations in energy affordability, identifying effective fuel poverty interventions and 
disseminating this knowledge are appropriate roles for the EU that should ensure the 
resources for fuel poverty alleviation achieve maximum impact. 
Appendix A - Explaining the Impact of Interventions 
Regarding household characteristics, median household expenditure in the RoI in 2009-10 
was around a third higher than in the UK in 2012 and approximately 50% higher than France 
in 2010-11. Second, Figure A1 shows the RoI had a far higher proportion of households using 
alternative fuels, i.e. utilising fuels other than gas and electricity than the UK (53.3% vs 7.4%). 
The higher percentage of Irish households using alternative fuels corresponds to this indicator 
being less effective for targeting high ENEX households: in the UK households using 
alternative fuels had the second highest ENEX10, while in the RoI these households had only 
the sixth highest ENEX10. Third, the RoI had a younger age profile than the UK: the percentage 
of households containing someone aged 65 or over was 10 percentage points lower in the 
RoI, while the percentage of households with children was 10 percentage points higher.  
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Some target groups are defined differently in the French dataset. Older households in France 
are identified by the head of the household being aged 65 or over rather than a household 
containing at least one person aged 65 or over. Furthermore, the percentage of households 
receiving ‘housing benefit’ in France was over 18% compared to less than 4% in the UK 
suggesting the policies referred to as ‘housing benefit’ were rather different.  
 
Figure A1: The percentage of households in the French, UK and Irish datasets in particular target 
groups55 (whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals) 
The percentage of each target group in ENEX10 fuel poverty is reported in Figure A2. In all 
three MS households with total expenditure below 60% of the median have the highest 
central estimate of ENEX10 fuel poverty. Comparing Figure A1 and Figure A2 the proportion 
                                                          
55 The definitions of groups can vary between the MSs. Where no bar is present a dataset did not contain an 
appropriate group identifier. 
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of households using fuels other than mains gas and electricity in ENEX10 fuel poverty appears 
inversely related to the percentage of households using alternative fuels. In the UK 41% of 
households using alternative fuels were in ENEX10 fuel poverty compared to only 16% in the 
RoI. 
 
Figure A2: The percentage of households in target groups who have an energy expenditure share 
exceeding 10% (whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals) 
Figure A3 combines the information in Figures A1 and A2 to report the proportion of all 
households who are in a target group and in ENEX10 fuel poverty. Hence, Figure A3 shows 
the maximum possible decrease in ENEX10 by targeting each household group. In the RoI, 
compared to the UK and France, it is noticeable that targeting households using alternative 
fuels allows a greater ENEX10 reduction than targeting elderly households. 
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Figure A3: The percentage of all households in a target group and with an energy expenditure 
share exceeding 10% (whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals) 
Table A1 gives an indication of the proximity of households in each target group to the ENEX10 
threshold. Overall, the estimated median ENEXShr of households in ENEX10 fuel poverty is 
fairly similar across the three MS, except when comparing households with an unemployed 
head or households in the highest ENEXShr decile between the UK and RoI. It is apparent that 
the proximity of a target group’s mass of ENEXShr to the ENEX10 threshold by itself does not 
determine an intervention’s ‘effectiveness’ by comparing Table A1 with Figure 9. Considering 
the UK, households with children have the closest median ENEXShr to the ENEX10 threshold, 
while low income households have the third highest median ENEXShr. However, Figure 9 
shows that reducing ENEX among low income households is the most ‘effective’ intervention, 
while targeting households with children is among the least ‘effective’ interventions.  
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Target Group UK France Republic of Ireland 
Whole Population 14.0 13.8 13.8 
Total Expenditure Beneath 60% of Median 15.4 15.4 14.8 
Contains a person 65 or over 14.4 14.7 14.7 
Single parent (1 adult with children) 14.1 13.6 13.6 
All households with children 13.1 12.9 12.8 
Lives in Social Housing 14.6 - 13.9 
Receives Housing Benefit 13.9 13.7 - 
Household Reference Person Unemployed 16.6 - 13.5 
Uses Fuels other than Gas/Electricity 15.1 14.4 13.6 
Highest Energy Expenditure Share Decile 17.8 17.1 15.1 
 
Table A1: Central estimates of the median energy expenditure share (%) of the subset of 
households that have energy expenditure shares exceeding 10% by household group 
Last, Table A2 give central estimates for the total cost of the interventions targeting each 
high-level household group. That the figures for the RoI are far lower than for France or the 
UK simply results from the RoI containing fair fewer households.  
Target Group UK France Republic of Ireland 
Whole Population 7,167 7,142 436 
Total Expenditure Beneath 60% of Median 1,834 1,608 104 
Contains a person 65 or over 2,092 1,778 83 
Single parent (1 adult with children) 350 593 32 
All households with children 2,072 2,560 171 
Lives in Social Housing 1,229 - 45 
Receives Housing Benefit 251 - 49 
Household Reference Person Unemployed 295 1,315 - 
Uses Fuels other than Gas/Electricity 717 1,750 232 
Highest Energy Expenditure Share Deceile 529 714 44 
 
Table A2: Central estimates of the cost (€m) of transferring €250 to each of the households in the 
specified target groups in 2017 prices 
Appendix B - Differences in interventions’ ‘effectiveness’ 
In Figures B1 and B2 the impact of interventions on ENEX10 in, respectively, the RoI and 
France are reported. Broadly speaking the results are similar to those for the UK in Figure 8. 
45 
 
The largest difference between the UK and the other two MS, is that in the RoI and France 
targeting households using alternative fuels has a greater impact on the central estimate of 
ENEX10.  
 
Figure B1: Interventions’ impact on the percentage of Irish households with an energy expenditure 
share exceeding 10% in 2009-10 (whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure B2: Interventions’ impact on the percentage of French households with an energy 
expenditure share exceeding 10% in 2010-11 (whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals) 
Considering Figures 9, B3 and B4, in all three MS the most effective interventions are ENEX 
reductions targeted at low income households. Similarly, in all three MS targeting older 
households is moderately effective, with the targeting power of these households appearing 
strongest (relative to other target groups) in the RoI. In the RoI targeting households in social 
housing is roughly as effective as targeting low income households and more effective than 
targeting the unemployed. Another feature of the RoI is that targeting a €250 ENEX reduction 
at households with the highest ENEXShr is, relative to other interventions, reasonably 
effective.  
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Figure B3: Effectiveness of interventions on reducing the percentage of Irish households with an 
energy expenditure share exceeding 10% in 2009-10 
 
Figure B4: Effectiveness of interventions on reducing the percentage of French households with an 
energy expenditure share exceeding 10% in 2010-11 
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